Thinking

When the Right Design Decision Is to Do Nothing

ProcessProduct Design·March 20, 2026·1 min read

Some of the most useful design work never makes it into a portfolio, because there’s nothing to show except a feature that didn’t get built and the argument for why. Try putting that on Dribbble.

Products pile up features, and each one makes sense on its own. Together they make everything harder to use. The pressure only goes one way, too. Nobody gets praised in the quarterly review for the feature they stopped.

Every feature adds something and costs something

What each one adds, and what it costs

Bulk exportWhat it adds: Power users can export large datasetsWhat it costs: New menu path, edge case surface area, maintenance burden
Notification preferencesWhat it adds: Users control alert frequencyWhat it costs: Settings complexity, support for "why am I not getting emails"
Saved filtersWhat it adds: Returning users skip re-configurationWhat it costs: State management, empty state, filter migration on schema change
Comparison modeWhat it adds: Side-by-side analysis across time periodsWhat it costs: Doubles cognitive load, requires users to already understand individual views
Benchmark overlayWhat it adds: Comparison with the platform averageWhat it costs: Shifts task from understanding own data to evaluating relative performance
In a Standish Group study of four internal applications, presented in 2002, 45% of features were never used. It’s a small sample, but every unused feature still has to be maintained.

Barry Schwartz’s research on choice is useful here. More options tend to make people less satisfied and slower to decide, even when every option is good. In product terms, a dashboard with twenty filters tells the user that twenty things might matter, and then leaves them to work out which.

On a marketplace analytics product, a request came in for benchmark toggles on every chart, so partners could compare themselves to platform averages. In the meeting it sounded completely sensible, and I said no. Partners were still learning to read their own numbers. A comparison would have turned "what’s happening with my business" into "how do I compare", which is a different task the product wasn’t built for yet. It went into the backlog with a clear condition for when to revisit it.

Do

The chart answers what’s happening with my business

Your revenue, last 8 weeks

Weekly revenue, € thousands

Up from €42k to €57k in 8 weeks.

Your revenue by week: week 1 €42k, week 2 €45k, week 3 €44k, week 4 €48k, week 5 €51k, week 6 €49k, week 7 €54k, week 8 €57k.

Illustrative data

Don’t

A benchmark on every chart changes the question

Your revenue, last 8 weeks

Weekly revenue, € thousands

This week you’re 16% below the platform average.

Your revenue by week: week 1 €42k, week 2 €45k, week 3 €44k, week 4 €48k, week 5 €51k, week 6 €49k, week 7 €54k, week 8 €57k. Platform average: week 1 €64k, week 2 €63k, week 3 €65k, week 4 €66k, week 5 €64k, week 6 €67k, week 7 €66k, week 8 €68k.

Illustrative data

The benchmark toggle had a good case and still got cut

The case for it, and why it was cut

The request
More contextPartners can see how they compare to platform average
Competitive signalUnderperforming partners motivated to improve
Precedent existsCommon in analytics dashboards across the industry
Why it was killed
Wrong cognitive modePartners still learning their own data: comparison shifts task before baseline exists
Two tasks, one viewUnderstanding own performance and evaluating relative performance require different mental models
Noise before signalContext nobody understands makes people anxious
Saying no to the benchmark toggle meant naming the exact task it would get in the way of.

Saying no in that meeting is uncomfortable, and "let’s keep it simple" never works, because it sounds lazy. What works is being specific about which task the feature interrupts and what would need to be true for it to belong.

That means you need a clear enough picture of what the product is for to judge a feature by what it costs, and most teams don’t have that written down anywhere. Writing it down is design work too, even if it never becomes a screen.

References

  1. Schwartz, B. (2004). The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less. Ecco.
  2. Johnson, J. (2002). Keynote on Standish Group feature usage, XP 2002 conference. Reported in Fowler, M. (2002). The XP 2002 Conference.